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Abstract 
Using a unique new survey, the Japanese Worker Representation and Participation 
Survey (JWRPS), this paper presents the first evidence on the representation/participation 
gaps among Japanese workers and its links to the degree of their discontent with work 
and the efficacy of celebrated participatory employment practices.  We find that: (i) 
contrary to the popular rhetoric of the end of “participatory Japanese management”, 
Japanese workers still desire more involvement and greater voice in firm decisions; and 
(ii) in spite of their strong desire to have more influence, many Japanese workers 
consider their current level of say at work less than adequate, resulting in significant 
representation/participation gaps which are comparable to what has been found for U.S. 
workers.  Furthermore, we find an alarming degree of discontent with work among 
Japanese workers, measured by diverse variables, and weak employee involvement and 
influence are found to be significantly linked to the degree of such discontent.  Finally, 
our analysis of the survey data yields evidence in support of the hypotheses that: (i) 
working in firms with strong participatory programs will significantly enhance employee 
voice; (ii) among those working in participatory firms, actually participating in these 
programs will yield an additional boost for employee voice; and (iii) financial 
participation schemes will align the interest of employees with the interest of the firm and 
thus make employees wanting to have more influence in firm decisions.  Our findings 
suggest that weakening participatory employment practices (as the popular rhetoric at 
times suggests) may result in exacerbating the already alarming degree of employee 
dissatisfaction in Japan.  1
I. Introduction 
Much of the literature on workplace institutions, especially on “new work 
practices” or “participatory employment practices” (such as self-directed work teams, 
offline project teams, QC, more performance-based compensation, financial participation, 
extensive training, job rotation) focus on  two questions: (i) what they do to the firm (e.g., 
their effects on firm performance);
1 and (ii) what kinds of firms are more likely to 
introduce them (e.g., technologically advanced firms with skilled labor force vs. other 
more traditional firms).
2  As a result, researchers tend to interview and survey the firms 
(typically, HR directors) and sometimes union officials.   An important question that has 
been neglected is what these “new work practices” do to workers?
3   
This is an important omission.  First, for many workers in industrialized nations 
such as Japan and the U.S., people spend much time at work and what happens at work 
will have a profound effect on their life.  Second, as the literature on skilled-biased 
technological change demonstrates, the quality of labor force has become an increasingly 
important source of firm’s competitive edge.
4 It is of prime importance to examine what 
these “new work practices” do to workers.   
                                                 
1 We are currently witnessing an impressive accumulation of systematic evidence on the 
effects on firm performance of such practices in the U.S.  See, for example, in the economics 
literature, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997), Helper (1998), Batt (1999), Cappelli and 
Neumark  (1999), Freeman, Kleiner, and Ostroff (2000), Bartel (2000), Appelbaum (2000), Black 
and Lynch (2001), Hamilton, Nickerson, Owan (2003) and articles featured in a special issue of 
Industrial Relations Vol. 35, July 1996.   However, such evidence is still relatively limited 
elsewhere.  See, for example, Jones and Kato (1995), Kato and Morishima (2002) for Japan; 
Leoni, et. al (2001) for Italy; Addison and Belfield (2000) for the U.K.; Eriksson (2003) for 
Denmark; Bayo-Moriones, Galilea-Salvatierra, and Merino-Diaz de Cerio (2003) for Spain.   
2 The adoption literature is smaller than the outcome effect literature.  See, for example, 
Pil and MacDuffie (1996) and Ichniowski and Shaw (1995).  For Japan, see Jones and Kato 
(1993), Kato and Morishima (2002). 
3 The most recent special issue in Industrial Relations (January 2004) is an attempt to fill 
this important gap in the literature.   
4 See, for example, Bartel and Sicherman (1999) and Berman, Bound, and Griliches 
(1994).    2
To fill this important gap in the literature, Freeman and Rogers (1999) conducted 
the Worker Representation and Participation Survey (WRPS) and presented the first 
evidence on what workers tell us about their experiences with the degree of their 
involvement and influence on firm decisions affecting their worklife in general and the 
impact of new work practices in particular.   
As part of a global network of labor economists who share the same sense of 
urgent need to conduct a survey similar to WRPS and provide the perspectives of workers, 
we decided to conduct the Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey 
(JWRPS).  On our reading of the literature, this is the first survey of this kind in Japan.    
We believe it is particularly timely to conduct the JWRPS and analyze the data.  
Japan was traditionally often viewed as a nirvana for employee participation and 
involvement, and attracted much attention and often envy from around the world in the 
1980s.  In recent years, however, with Japan’s prolonged economic slowdown, the 
popular rhetoric within Japan as well as outside of Japan has been shifting and has 
become less positive about traditional Japanese management with particular emphasis on 
employee participation and involvement (some even suggest the replacement of the 
participatory system with the Anglo-American model of active external labor market).   
While the rhetoric of “the end of Japanese management” is presently rampant, concrete 
data on changes in traditional employment practices are relatively scarce (Dore, 1996).  
Particularly data on workers’ views and assessment of their voice at workplace and 
participatory employment practices are limited.   
With full collaboration with Denki Rengo (Japanese Electrical, Electronic, 
Information Union) and Nikkei Research, we conducted the JWRPS in December 2004.  
Among 659,729 workers who belong to Denki Rengo, we randomly selected 3,000   3
workers.  We received usable responses from 2,611 workers (a response rate of 87 
percent).  The impressive 87 percent response rate makes our unionized worker sample 
unusually reliable.   
To construct a matching sample of workers in firms without union, we randomly 
selected 2,275 workers who work in non-unionized firms in the same electrical, 
electronic and information industries.  We received usable responses from 445 workers (a 
response rate of 19.6 percent).  The response rate of 19.6 percent is comparable to most 
surveys of similar nature in Japan.       
The survey itself was preceded by a pilot phase in which an earlier version of the 
instrument was tested on a select group of Denki Rengo members.  On the basis of what 
we learned from this, the questionnaire was revised.   
This paper presents the first findings from our analysis of the data from the 
JWRPS.  We begin with gauging the size of the representation/participation gaps (the gap 
between how much involvement and influence workers want to have and how much they 
actually have) among Japanese workers.  We will then examine the proportion of 
discontented workers in Japan and its link to the amount of involvement and influence 
workers have on decisions affecting workplace.  We will then investigate the 
relationships between employee voice and celebrated participatory employment practices 
of Japanese firms, including JLMCs (Joint Labor-Management Practices), SFCs 
(Shopfloor Committees), and SGAs (Small Group Activities), PSPs (Profit Sharing 
Plans), GSPs (Gainsharing Plans), and ESOPs (Employee Stock Ownership Plans).   
II. Participation Gap 
  As shown in Table 1, 75 percent of all workers in the electrical, electronic and 
information industries agree that it is very important to have a lot of involvement and   4
influence (referred to as “wanting influence”) on deciding how to do their job and 
organize the work whereas only 44 percent of all workers actually have such involvement 
and influence (referred to as “having influence”).  It turns out that a full 35 percent of all 
workers have a “specific participation gap,” i.e., considering it very important to have a 
lot of involvement and influence on deciding how to do their job and organize the work 
yet having no such involvement and influence.  As explained in Freeman and Rogers 
(1999), the specific participation gap tends to understate the true 
participation/representation gap since to be considered to have a participation gap, a 
worker will need to agree first that it is very important to have a lot of involvement and 
influence and then reports that he/she does not have a lot of involvement and influence.  
However, some workers consider it only somewhat important to have a lot of 
involvement and influence yet report having no involvement and influence at all.  The 
specific participation gap assumes that these workers do not have any 
participation/representation gap.   
  To remedy the problem, Freeman and Rogers (1999) propose to use a more 
general participation gap measure, i.e., the proportion of workers who have less 
involvement and influence than he/she wants to have.  Table 1 also reports such “general 
participation gap”.  As expected, a higher proportion of workers turn out to have the 
general participation gap (42 percent).     
  Table 1 also reports the same statistics for unionized and non-unionized workers 
separately as well as for workers with and without supervisory responsibilities separately.  
It turns out that we find no statistically significant difference in the proportion of workers 
who fall into each category between unionized and non-unionized workers.      5
  On the other hand, we find statistically significant differences between workers 
with and without supervisory responsibilities.  Specifically, workers without supervisory 
responsibilities turn out to be more likely to have the specific and general participation 
gap than workers with such responsibilities.   
  Finally, to see if the same conclusions can be drawn when we consider only 
unionized workers, we repeated the same analysis using a sample of unionized workers 
only.  The last rows of Table 1 confirm that the differences between workers with and 
without supervisory responsibilities are not sensitive to whether we consider all workers 
or only unionized workers.   
  Despite that our study is not strictly comparable to Freeman and Rogers (1999) 
who conducted a similar survey of workers in the U.S., the proportion of Japanese 
workers “wanting influence” is remarkably similar to what they found for U.S. workers.  
Nevertheless, the proportion of Japanese workers “having influence” is considerably 
lower than the U.S. figure, resulting in a greater participation gap among Japanese 
workers than among U.S. workers.  There appears to be no evidence suggesting that the 
participation gap is unusually small among Japanese workers although again, we should 
consider such cross-national comparisons with much caution.   
  Tables 2-4 report the same proportions for the three different areas of decisions on 
which workers may want to have influence: (i) setting goals for their work group or 
department; (ii) setting work schedules, including breaks, overtime and time off; and (iii) 
deciding what training is needed for people in their work group or department.  Again, 
similar to what Freeman and Rogers (1999) found for U.S. workers, the proportion of 
workers “wanting influence” on setting goals for their work group or department is 48 
percent (55 percent of U.S. workers in Freeman and Rogers, 1999), and is substantially   6
lower than the proportion of workers “wanting influence” on deciding how to do their job 
and organize the work.   
The proportion of workers “having influence” on setting goals for their work 
group or department is extremely low (less than 8 percent), making both specific and 
general participation gaps very large.  In particular, our general participation gap measure 
indicates that 7 in 10 Japanese workers want more influence on setting goals for their 
work group and department than what they currently have.  These calculated participation 
gaps on setting goals for work group are about twice as large as what Freeman and 
Rogers (1999) report for U.S. workers. 
Interestingly, according to Table 2, the proportion of workers with general 
participation gap is greater for unionized workers than for non-unionized workers (75 
percent vs. 71 percent).  The difference may be due to the fact that non-unionized 
workers are more likely to report having such influence than unionized workers (12 
percent vs. 7 percent). 
Workers with supervisory responsibilities are more likely to “have influence” and 
have a general participation gap on setting goals for their work group or department than 
workers without such responsibilities, and these differences are statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level.  The results are for the most part preserved even when we consider 
unionized workers only.   
  As shown in Tables 3 and 4, the proportion of workers “wanting influence” on 
setting work schedules and deciding on training is considerably lower than on the first 
two areas of decisions.  Thus, only a little over 30 percent of workers “want influence” on 
setting work schedules and deciding on training.  That workers are less apt to “want 
influence” on setting work schedules than on the other areas of decisions was also found   7
for U.S. workers by Freeman and Rogers (1999).  However, our finding of Japanese 
workers less likely to “want influence” on training than the other areas is at odd with 
what Freeman and Rogers (1999) found for U.S. workers.   
  Turning to the proportion of workers “having influence”, our results on setting 
work schedules and training diverge considerably.  Specifically, only 7 percent of 
workers reported to “have influence” on deciding on training whereas 16 percent of 
workers reported to “have influence” on setting work schedules.  This results in much 
wider participation gaps on training than on setting work schedules (28 percent vs. 21 
percent for specific gap and 70 percent vs. 59 percent for general gap).
5  
  The union/non-union differences are much more significant for training than for 
work schedules.  Thus, unionized workers are less likely to “want influence”, “have 
influence”, and have a specific participation gap on deciding on training than non-
unionized workers.   
  For both work schedules and training, we find that workers without supervisory 
responsibilities are less likely to “have influence” and are more likely to have a general 
participation gap than workers with supervisory responsibilities, and such 
supervisory/non-supervisory differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
Finally, the observed supervisory/non-supervisory differences are found to change little 
even when we consider only unionized workers. 
  In sum, the popular rhetoric seems to suggest that once-celebrated Japanese 
management with particular emphasis on employee participation and involvement is now 
less relevant and Japanese workers are no longer interested in the outmoded system.  
Contrary to such popular rhetoric, we find that Japanese workers are indeed interested in 
                                                 
5 Freeman and Rogers (1999) found a similar pattern for U.S. workers.    8
having influence in general (particularly on deciding how to do their job and organize the 
work).  We also find that in spite of their strong desire to have say, many Japanese 
workers find their current level of voice at work less than adequate, resulting in 
significant representation/participation gaps which are comparable to what has been 
found for U.S. workers.  The gaps are particularly pronounced for workers without 
supervisory responsibilities.     
 
III. Weak Employee Involvement/Influence and Discontented Workers  
  We examine the extent to which the lack of employee involvement and influence 
leads to a higher proportion of discontented workers.  Following Freeman and Rogers 
(1999), we consider the following five measures of the proportion of discontented 
workers: (i) the proportion of workers who agree or somewhat agree that they usually do 
not look forward to going to work (weak motivation); (ii) the proportion of workers who 
are overall dissatisfied with their current jobs (dissatisfaction); (iii) the proportion of 
workers who do not feel loyal to their firm (weak loyalty); (iv) the proportion of workers 
who trust information provided by their firm only a little or not at all (mistrust); and (v) 
the proportion of workers who rate labor management relations as only fair or poor (weak 
labor management relations).   
  Tables 5-8 show the link between employee dissatisfaction and the lack of 
employee voice on each of the four areas of company decisions affecting workplace.  
First, the first row of Table 5 provides the proportion of discontented workers in Japan.  
The proportion of discontented workers in Japan is hardly negligible.   Nearly one in two 
Japanese workers agree or somewhat agree that they usually do not look forward to going 
to work.  About 30 percent of Japanese workers are overall dissatisfied with their current   9
jobs.  The proportion of Japanese workers who do not feel loyal to their firm is 28 percent.  
Close to 20 percent of Japanese workers either do not at all trust information provided by 
their firm or trust such information only a little.  Finally, 42 percent of Japanese workers 
rate labor management relations as only fair or poor.
6   
  As shown in these tables, workers without a lot of involvement and influence are 
more likely to be discontented with their work, i.e., usually do not look forward to going 
to work; be overall dissatisfied with their current jobs; do not feel loyal to their firm; have 
less trust to information provided by their firm; and consider labor management relations 
as only fair or poor.  The differences between workers with and without a lot of 
involvement and influence are statistically significant at the 1 percent level consistently 
for all measures of employee discontentment and for all four areas of firm decisions 
affecting workplace except for decisions on training in which the difference in the 
proportion of workers who either do not at all trust information provided by their firm or 
trust information only a little is statistically significant at the 5 percent level and the 
difference in the proportion of workers who rate labor management relations as only fair 
or poor is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level.   
  The remainder of each table provides an account of whether the statistically 
significant link between employee dissatisfaction and employee involvement will 
disappear when we consider only unionized workers and further split the sample of 
unionized workers into unionized workers with and without supervisory responsibilities.  
                                                 
6 Cross-national comparison of worker discontent is particularly difficult and it is nearly 
impossible to construct survey instruments that are strictly comparable between Japan and the 
U.S.  With that caution in mind, the degree of employee discontent revealed in our survey appear 
to be comparable or greater than what Freeman and Rogers (1999) discovered for U.S. workers 
(especially the proportion of workers with weak motivation in Japan appears to be alarmingly 
high).         10
First, we find no discernable change in the results when we consider unionized workers 
only.  This is true for all four areas of firm decisions and for all discontentment measures.   
  Second, the statistically significant discontentment-involvement link regarding 
decisions on how to do their jobs and organize the work is found not only for workers 
with supervisory responsibilities but also for workers without such responsibilities 
consistently for all discontentment measures.  For the other three areas of decisions, 
however, the results are somewhat less consistent, i.e., we still find statistically 
significant discontentment-involvement links for workers with supervisory 
responsibilities consistently whereas such discontentment-involvement links are less 
regularly found for workers without supervisory responsibilities.  Specifically, for 
workers without supervisory responsibilities, the statistically significant discontentment-
involvement link is found only for dissatisfaction and mistrust when we consider 
decisions on goals (Table 6) and for weak labor management relations when we consider 
decisions on work schedules (Table 7).    
 
IV. Participatory Employment Practices and Employee Influence  
As Levine and Tyson (1990) suggest, relatively greater job security and strong 
group cohesiveness of Japanese workers in large manufacturing companies in the postwar 
era point to an industrial relations system favorable to successful employee participation.  
In addition, steady economic growth over the sample period, lower unemployment and 
stable financial corporate grouping point to an external environment favorable to 
successful employee participation. 
Probably as a result of these favorable environments in the postwar Japanese 
economy, in particular in manufacturing, participatory employment practices diffused   11
widely and were established firmly (Kato and Morishima, 2002).  Indeed these practices 
became the hallmark of “Japanese management,” which has been rousing (or requiring in 
some instances) many U.S. corporations to experiment with employee involvement and 
labor-management cooperation lately (see, for instance, Levine, 1995: 5). In short, the 
postwar Japanese economy (especially in manufacturing) clearly represents one of the 
most important examples of experimentation with participatory employment practices.
7  
The JWRPS enables us for the first time to investigate whether these celebrated 
participatory employment practices are indeed helping Japanese workers develop a strong 
sense of involvement and influence on company decisions affecting their workplace.  It is 
particularly timely to study the link between participatory employment practices and 
employee sense of involvement and influence at this time in light of the popular rhetoric 
that once-celebrated Japanese participatory management is now less relevant and 
sometime even harmful in the rapidly changing globalized marketplace.      
As shown in Table 9, we consider six employment practices which are often 
considered key work practices of participatory Japanese management in the literature.
8 
Table 9 confirms the prevalence of these practices among Japanese workers in the 
electrical, electronic, and information industries.  As such, over 60 percent of workers 
work for firms with SFCs (Shopfloor Committees) in which supervisors and employees 
on shop floor regularly discuss issues such as shop-floor operations and shop-floor 
environments.  Among those workers in firms with SFCs, about one in two workers 
                                                 
7 The economic slowdown in the 1990s and a rapidly aging workforce in Japan have 
allegedly been eroding the aforementioned participation-friendly environments.  See Kato (2001, 
2003a), Chuma (1998, 2002), and Ohashi and Tachibanaki (1998) for evolving employment 
practices in Japan. 
8 See, for instance, Ohashi (1989) and Ohkusa and Ohtake (1997) for PSPs, Jones and 
Kato (1993, 1995) for ESOPs, Kato and Morishima (2002) for JLMCs and SFCs, and Kato 
(2003a) for SGAs.       12
always attend SFC meetings.  Unionized workers are more likely to be in firms with 
SFCs than non-unionized workers and workers with supervisory responsibilities are more 
apt to be in firms with SFCs and always attend SFC meetings than workers without such 
responsibilities.   
Somewhat surprisingly, only 44 percent of workers in the electrical, electronic 
and information industries work in firms with SGAs (Small Group Activities) such as 
quality control (QC) circles and Zero Defects in which small groups at the workplace 
level voluntarily set plans and goals concerning operations and work together toward 
accomplishing these plans and goals.  This is in part due to the fact that a significant 
number of firms in the industries terminated SGAs in recent years.
9  We fail to find any 
statistically significant differences in the proportion of workers in firms with SGAs 
between unionized and non-unionized workers as well as between unionized workers 
with and without supervisory responsibilities.     
The participation rate of workers in firms with SGAs is remarkably high (85 
percent), confirming that Japanese SGAs are indeed broad-based.  The SGA participation 
rate is higher for unionized than for non-unionized workers and the difference is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  On the other hand, there is no statistically 
significant difference in the participation rate between workers with and without 
supervisory responsibilities.   
One of the core mechanisms for labor-management relations within a large 
Japanese firm is joint labor-management committees (JLMCs).  Established at the top 
                                                 
9 Chuma (2003) documents the rising importance of information sharing between 
production workers and design and development engineers as the complexity of production 
process rises in Japan.  Traditional SGAs with heavy reliance on production workers’ problem 
solving skills may be less effective in recent years with the rising complexity of manufacturing 
process.  We will examine this important issue in more details in our forthcoming paper.   13
level (corporate and/or establishment level) and involving both management and union 
representatives, JLMCs serve as a mechanism for employee participation/involvement at 
the top level, covering a large variety of issues ranging from basic business policies to 
working conditions.
10  As Kato (2003b) shows, the productivity effects of JLMCs vary 
significantly, depending on how widely information shared in JLMCs is disseminated to 
the rank and files.  To this end, we calculate the proportion of workers who said that all 
information provided in JLMCs is shared with them.  Approximately 13 percent of 
workers said that all information provided in JLMCs is indeed shared with them.  
Unionized workers are more likely to receive full information shared in JLMCs than non-
unionized workers and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
This is consistent with Kato (2003a) who presents quantitative and qualitative evidence 
that Japanese unions play an important complementary role in employee participation and 
involvement.   
Turning to financial participation schemes, as expected, PSPs (Profit Sharing 
Plans) which link at least a portion of employee pay to a measure of firm-wide 
performance, such as profit are extremely wide spread among workers in the electrical, 
electronic and information industries (over 80 percent of workers are currently under 
PSPs ).  PSPs are more popular among unionized workers than among non-unionized 
workers and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  Likewise, 
unionized workers with supervisory responsibilities are more likely to be paid under PSP 
than workers without such responsibilities and the difference is again statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level.   
                                                 
10 See, for example, Kato (2003a) for detailed institutional information on JLMCs.     14
The literature on Japanese financial participation schemes is relatively silent on 
GSPs (Gainsharing Plans) in which at least a portion of employee pay is linked to 
performance of work group or department, such as accomplishments of group-wide or 
departmental goals.  The JWRPS provides the first reliable evidence on the prevalence of 
GSPs among Japanese workers.  Among our electrical, electric and information workers, 
nearly 50 percent of workers are paid under GSPs.  GSPs are considerably more popular 
among unionized workers than among non-unionized workers (51 percent vs. 27 percent) 
and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  There is no 
statistically significant difference between workers with and without supervisory 
responsibilities.   
Finally, 28 percent of workers in the electrical, electric and information industries 
participate in an ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plans).  Unionized workers and 
workers with supervisory responsibilities are more apt to participate in an ESOP than 
non-unionized workers and workers without supervisory responsibilities and the 
differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   
We expect non-financial participation mechanisms such as SFCs, SGAs and 
JLMCs to enhance employee sense of involvement and influence (or “having influence”) 
since after all the main objective of these institutions is to foster employee voice.   
On the other hand, we expect financial participation schemes (including PSPs, 
GSPs and ESOPs) to nurture employee interest and desire to have involvement and 
influence in firm decisions (or “wanting influence”), for a key function of financial 
participation schemes is to align the interest of workers with the interest of the firm.  
Such goal alignments will make employees more interested in firm performance and thus 
involvement and influence on firm decisions.     15
Tables 10-12 present the results on the link between non-financial participation 
and “having influence” while Tables 13 and 14 the results on the relationship between 
financial participation and “wanting influence”.  Overall, Tables 10-12 confirm our 
expectation that there is a statistically significant link between non-financial participation 
and worker “having influence”.  Specifically, workers in firms with SFCs, SGAs and full 
disclosure JLMCs are significantly more likely to have “influence” on decisions 
(regardless of which of the four areas of decision is considered) than other workers, and 
the differences are statistically significantly at least at the 10 percent (often at the 1 
percent).  The results do not depend on whether we consider unionized workers only 
except for the case of full disclosure JLMCs in which we get the statistically significant 
link only for decisions on how to do their job and organize the work.  Finally, the link 
between non-financial participation and “having influence” appear to be more significant 
for workers with supervisory responsibilities than workers without such responsibilities.     
For SFCs and SGAs, the JWRPS will allow us to further test if among workers in 
firms with each program, workers who actually participate in each program are more 
likely to “have influence”.  Table 10 provides evidence that strong participation in SFCs 
is indeed overall beneficial for workers enhancing voice whereas Table 11 suggest that 
such beneficial effects are somewhat limited for SGAs (a statistically significant link of 
participation in SGAs to “having influence” is obtained only when we consider one of the 
four areas of decisions, or how to do their job and organize the work).   
Turning to the relationship between financial participation and “wanting 
influence”, the strongest evidence is found for GSPs (Table 13).  Consistently for all four 
areas of decisions and all different groups of workers except for the case of influence of   16
unionized workers with supervisory responsibilities on decisions on job, we find 
statistically significant relationships between GSPs and workers “wanting influence”.   
For PSPs, we find that workers with PSPs are significantly more likely to “want 
influence” on decisions on jobs and goals whereas we find no statistically significant link 
between PSPs and “wanting influence” on decisions on work schedules and training.  The 
results are found for all different groups of workers except for unionized workers with 
supervisory responsibilities (Table 13).   
As shown in Table 14, ESOPs appear to have a weakest link to workers “wanting 
influence”.  Most significant results are found for unionized workers without supervisory 
responsibilities for whom we find statistically significant relationships between ESOPs 
and “wanting influence” for decisions on job and goals.   
That GSPs tend to be most strongly linked to “wanting influence” is consistent 
with the free-rider theory of financial participation.  Weitzman and Kruse (1990: 100) 
argue that profit sharing works only when the free rider problem is effectively eased.  By 
linking pay to group-level or departmental performance, GSPs is less subject to the free-
rider problem as compared to PSPs and ESOPs in which compensation is linked to 
company-wide performance.  The incentive effect of GSPs is thus less diluted than those 
of PSPs and ESOPs.    
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
  Using a unique new survey of Japanese workers in the electrical, electronic and 
information industries (JWRPS), this paper has presented the first evidence on the size of 
the representation/participation gaps among Japanese workers and its links to the 
proportion of discontented workers.  Furthermore, we have investigated the relationships   17
between employee voice and celebrated participatory employment practices of Japanese 
firms, including JLMCs (Joint Labor-Management Practices), SFCs (Shopfloor 
Committees), and SGAs (Small Group Activities), PSPs (Profit Sharing Plans), GSPs 
(Gainsharing Plans), and ESOPs (Employee Stock Ownership Plans).   
  We have found that contrary to the popular rhetoric of the end of “participatory 
Japanese management”, we find that Japanese workers still desire more involvement and 
greater voice in firm decisions (particularly decisions influencing how to do their job and 
organize the work).  We also find that in spite of their strong desire to have more 
influence, many Japanese workers find their current level of say at work less than 
adequate, resulting in significant representation/participation gaps which are comparable 
to what has been found for U.S. workers.  The gaps are particularly pronounced for 
workers without supervisory responsibilities.  We also find consistent evidence that weak 
employee involvement and influence is significantly linked to employee dissatisfaction 
measured by diverse variables (weak motivation, overall dissatisfaction, weak loyalty, 
mistrust and poor labor management relations).  
  Regarding the impact of participatory employment practices, we have found 
evidence in support of our hypotheses: (i) working in participatory firms with 
participatory programs will significantly enhance employee voice; (ii) among those 
working in participatory firms, actually participating in these programs will yield an 
additional boost for employee voice; and (iii) financial participation schemes will align 
the interest of employees with the interest of the firm and thus make employees more 
wanting to have influence in firm decisions.   
  Our evidence suggests that Japanese workers are not saturated with participation 
and that they are still very much interested in enhancing their say at workplace.  At the   18
same time, there appears to be an alarming degree of general worker dissatisfaction and 
the degree of such worker dissatisfaction is significantly related to the lack of employee 
involvement and influence.
11  Furthermore, we find evidence that employee voice is 
significantly linked to the presence of participatory employment programs and actual 
participation in such programs.  It follows that weakening participatory employment 
practices as the popular rhetoric sometimes suggests may result in exacerbating the 
already alarming degree of discontent with work among Japanese workers.   
  Finally, though the electrical, electronic and information industries represent very 
important segments of the Japanese economy, to get a truly representative picture of all 
Japanese workers encompassing diverse industries, the JWRPS will need to be conducted 
in many other industries.   
                                                 
11 Particularly noteworthy are the surprisingly high proportion of Japanese workers with weak 
motivation and the significantly weakening SGAs in recent years.       19
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 Table 1 Participation Gap: Deciding how to do your job and organize the work
Wanting Influence Having Influence Specific Participation Gap General Participation Gap
%worker for whom it is very 
important to have a lot of 
involvement and influence on 
deciding how to do their job 
and organize the work
%worker who have a lot 
of involvement and 
influence on deciding 
how to do their job and 
organize the work
%worker for whom it is very important to 
have a lot of involvement and influence on 
deciding how to do their job and organize 
the work yet who do not have a lot of 
involvement and influence
%worker with less 
involvement and influence 
on deciding how to do your 
job and organize the work 
than he/she wants
Total N 3039 3045 3056 3056
% 74.83% 43.94% 35.05% 41.59%
Unionized workers N 2596 2602 2611 2611
% 74.46% 43.47% 35.12% 41.71%
Non-unionized 
workers N 443 443 445 445
% 76.98% 46.73% 34.61% 40.90%
Workers without 
supervisory 
responsibilities N 1830 1835 1842 1842
% 73.06% 36.68% 39.31% 48.97%
Workers with 
supervisory 
responsibilities N 1209 1210 1214 1214





responsibilities N 1567 1572 1579 1579
% 72.43% 36.90% 38.70% 48.45%
Workers with 
supervisory 
responsibilities N 1029 1030 1032 1032
% 77.55% 53.50% 29.65% 31.40%
Source: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS)
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 1 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 5 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 10 percent level.Table 2 Participation Gap: Setting goals for your work group or department
Wanting Influence Having Influence Specific Participation Gap General Participation Gap
%worker for whom it is very 
important to have a lot of 
involvement and influence on 
setting goals for your work 
group or department
%worker who have a lot 
of involvement and 
influence on setting 
goals for your work 
group or department
%worker for whom it is very important to 
have a lot of involvement and influence on 
setting goals for your work group or 
department yet who do not have a lot of 
involvement and influence
%worker with less 
involvement and influence 
on setting goals for your 
work group or department 
than he/she wants
Total N 3032 3036 3056 3056
% 47.63% 7.84% 40.51% 74.41%
Unionized workers N 2591 2595 2611 2611
% 47.20% 7.13% 40.67% 74.95%
Non-unionized 
workers N 441 441 445 445
% 50.11% 12.02% 39.55% 71.24%
Workers without 
supervisory 
responsibilities N 1823 1827 1842 1842
% 43.77% 4.16% 39.58% 79.91%
Workers with 
supervisory 
responsibilities N 1209 1209 1214 1214





responsibilities N 1562 1566 1579 1579
% 42.96% 3.70% 39.20% 79.86%
Workers with 
supervisory 
responsibilities N 1029 1029 1032 1032
% 53.64% 12.34% 42.93% 67.44%
Source: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS)
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 1 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 5 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 10 percent level.Table 3 Participation Gap: Setting work schedules, including breaks, overtime and time off
Wanting Influence Having Influence Specific Participation Gap General Participation Gap
%worker for whom it is very 
important to have a lot of 
involvement and influence on 
setting work schedules, 
including breaks, overtime 
and time off
%worker who have a lot 
of involvement and 
influence on setting work 
schedules, including 
breaks, overtime and 
time off
%worker for whom it is very important to 
have a lot of involvement and influence on 
setting work schedules, including breaks, 
overtime and time off yet who do not have 
a lot of involvement and influence
%worker with less 
involvement and influence 
on setting work schedules, 
including breaks, overtime 
and time off than he/she 
wants
Total N 3031 3038 3056 3056
% 31.24% 15.50% 20.71% 59.39%
Unionized workers N 2590 2597 2611 2611
% 31.31% 15.90% 20.38% 58.64%
Non-unionized 
workers N 441 441 445 445
% 30.84% 13.15% 22.70% 63.82%
Workers without 
supervisory 
responsibilities N 1823 1829 1842 1842
% 30.66% 12.96% 21.66% 64.88%
Workers with 
supervisory 
responsibilities N 1208 1209 1214 1214





responsibilities N 1562 1568 1579 1579
% 30.73% 13.58% 21.28% 63.65%
Workers with 
supervisory 
responsibilities N 1028 1029 1032 1032
% 32.20% 19.44% 18.99% 50.97%
Source: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS)
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 1 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 5 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 10 percent level.Table 4 Participation Gap: Deciding what training is needed for people in your work group or department
Wanting Influence Having Influence Specific Participation Gap General Participation Gap
%worker for whom it is very 
important to have a lot of 
involvement and influence on 
deciding what training is 
needed for people in your 
work group or department
%worker who have a lot 
of involvement and 
influence on deciding 
what training is needed 
for people in your work 
group or department
%worker for whom it is very important to 
have a lot of involvement and influence on 
deciding what training is needed for people 
in your work group or department yet who 
do not have a lot of involvement and 
influence
%worker with less 
involvement and influence 
on deciding what training is 
needed for people in your 
work group or department 
than he/she wants
Total N 3029 3040 3056 3056
% 33.44% 6.97% 28.08% 69.73%
Unionized workers N 2589 2598 2611 2611
% 32.37% 6.58% 27.38% 69.51%
Non-unionized 
workers N 440 442 445 445
% 39.77% 9.28% 32.13% 71.01%
Workers without 
supervisory 
responsibilities N 1822 1830 1842 1842
% 31.83% 3.50% 28.94% 78.94%
Workers with 
supervisory 
responsibilities N 1207 1210 1214 1214





responsibilities N 1561 1568 1579 1579
% 31.07% 3.57% 27.99% 78.15%
Workers with 
supervisory 
responsibilities N 1028 1030 1032 1032
% 34.34% 11.17% 26.45% 56.30%
Source: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS)
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 1 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 5 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 10 percent level.Table 5 Discontent and Employee Involvement and Influence: Deciding how to do your job and organize the work
%workers who agree or 
somewhat agree that they 
usually do not look 






do not feel loyal 
to their firm
%workers who trust 
information provided by 
their firm only a little or 
not at all
%workers who rate 
labor management 
relations as only fair or 
poor
Total N 3038 3043 3039 3037 3021
% 45.49% 30.04% 28.07% 18.70% 41.77%
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence N 1335 1334 1333 1332 1324
% 41.20% 23.09% 23.03% 16.22% 34.82%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 1692 1698 1696 1695 1687
% 48.94% 35.51% 32.02% 20.65% 47.18%
Unionized workers
Total N 2593 2598 2596 2595 2598
% 46.66% 29.87% 27.47% 18.07% 36.76%
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence N 1128 1127 1127 1127 1128
% 42.29% 23.07% 22.36% 16.06% 28.81%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 1456 1462 1461 1460 1461
% 50.21% 35.16% 31.49% 19.59% 42.85%
Unionized workers with supervisory responsibilities
Total N 1021 1024 1023 1023 1024
% 40.35% 25.00% 21.31% 14.37% 29.20%
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence  N 549 549 549 549 549
% 36.79% 20.22% 17.85% 14.03% 21.49%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 470 473 472 472 473
% 44.47% 30.66% 25.42% 14.83% 38.27%
Unionized workers without supervisory responsibilities
Total N 1572 1574 1573 1572 1574
% 50.76% 33.04% 31.47% 20.48% 41.68%
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence  N 579 578 578 578 579
% 47.50% 25.78% 26.64% 17.99% 35.75%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 986 989 989 988 988
% 52.94% 37.31% 34.38% 21.86% 45.04%
Source: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS)
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 1 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 5 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 10 percent level.Table 6 Discontent and Employee Involvement and Influence: Setting goals for your work group or department
%workers who agree 
or somewhat agree 
that they usually do 
not look forward to 
going to work
%workers who are 
overall dissastified 
with their current jobs
%workers who 
do not feel loyal 
to their firm
%workers who trust 
information provided by 
their firm only a little or 
not at all
%workers who rate labor 
management relations as 
only fair or poor
Total
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence N 236 237 237 237 233
% 30.93% 17.72% 18.14% 11.81% 33.48%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 2782 2786 2784 2781 2769
% 46.80% 31.08% 28.92% 19.31% 42.36%
Unionized workers
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence N 183 184 184 184 184
% 32.24% 17.39% 17.93% 9.78% 29.35%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 2394 2398 2398 2396 2398
% 47.95% 30.90% 28.27% 18.70% 37.24%
Unionized workers with 
supervisory responsibilities
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence  N 125 126 126 126 126
% 27.20% 15.87% 14.29% 8.73% 22.22%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 893 895 895 894 895
% 42.33% 26.37% 22.35% 15.21% 30.17%
Unionized workers without 
supervisory responsibilities
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence  N5 8 5 8 5 8 5 8 5 8
% 43.10% 20.69% 25.86% 12.07% 44.83%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 1501 1503 1503 1502 1503
% 51.30% 33.60% 31.80% 20.77% 41.45%
Source: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS)
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 1 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 5 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 10 percent level.Table 7 Discontent and Employee Involvement and Influence: Setting work schedules, including breaks, overtime and time off
%workers who agree 
or somewhat agree 
that they usually do 
not look forward to 
going to work
%workers who are 
overall dissastified 
with their current jobs
%workers who 
do not feel loyal 
to their firm
%workers who trust 
information provided by 
their firm only a little or 
not at all
%workers who rate labor 
management relations as 
only fair or poor
Total
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence N 469 469 468 468 467
% 41.15% 23.88% 23.29% 14.32% 31.05%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 2551 2556 2555 2552 2537
% 46.30% 31.14% 28.92% 19.51% 43.67%
Unionized workers
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence N 411 411 411 411 411
% 41.36% 24.33% 22.87% 14.11% 27.25%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 2168 2173 2173 2171 2173
% 47.79% 30.97% 28.39% 18.79% 38.52%
Unionized workers with 
supervisory responsibilities
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence  N 198 198 198 198 198
% 32.32% 19.70% 15.66% 10.61% 21.21%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 820 823 823 822 823
% 42.32% 26.37% 22.72% 15.33% 31.23%
Unionized workers without 
supervisory responsibilities
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence  N 213 213 213 213 213
% 49.77% 28.64% 29.58% 17.37% 32.86%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 1348 1350 1350 1349 1350
% 51.11% 33.78% 31.85% 20.90% 42.96%
Source: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS)
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 1 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 5 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 10 percent level.Table 8 Discontent and Employee Involvement and Influence: Deciding what training is needed for people in your work group or department
%workers who agree 
or somewhat agree 
that they usually do 
not look forward to 
going to work
%workers who are 
overall dissastified 
with their current jobs
%workers who 
do not feel loyal 
to their firm
%workers who trust 
information provided by 
their firm only a little or 
not at all
%workers who rate labor 
management relations as 
only fair or poor
Total
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence N 211 211 211 210 210
% 35.55% 17.54% 16.59% 12.86% 36.67%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 2811 2816 2814 2812 2796
% 46.25% 30.97% 28.93% 19.13% 42.13%
Unionized workers
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence N 170 170 170 169 170
% 35.29% 19.41% 17.65% 13.02% 31.76%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 2410 2415 2415 2414 2415
% 47.55% 30.64% 28.20% 18.39% 37.10%
Unionized workers with 
supervisory responsibilities
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence  N 114 114 114 114 114
% 29.82% 16.67% 10.53% 7.89% 25.44%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 905 908 908 907 908
% 41.66% 26.10% 22.69% 15.21% 29.74%
Unionized workers without 
supervisory responsibilities
workers with a lot of 
involvement and influence  N5 6 5 6 5 6 5 5 5 6
% 46.43% 25.00% 32.14% 23.64% 44.64%
workers without a lot of 
involvement and influence N 1505 1507 1507 1507 1507
% 51.10% 33.38% 31.52% 20.31% 41.54%
Source: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS)
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 1 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 5 percent level.
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Total N 3051 1796 3045 1324 3033 2997 2970 3026
% 61.16% 51.67% 43.74% 84.89% 12.56% 81.01% 47.34% 28.52%
Unionized workers N 2607 1558 2601 1144 2591 2553 2527 2583
% 62.18% 51.86% 44.29% 86.54% 13.20% 85.15% 50.89% 30.78%
Non-Unionized 
workers N 444 238 444 180 442 444 443 443
% 55.18% 50.42% 40.54% 74.44% 8.82% 57.21% 27.09% 15.35%
Unionized workers 
with supervisory 
responsibilities N 1030 683 1027 448 1023 1010 1002 1015
% 68.45% 57.10% 43.82% 88.17% 14.37% 89.80% 52.79% 37.93%
Unionized workers 
without supervisory 
responsibilities N 1577 875 1574 696 1568 1543 1525 1568
% 58.08% 47.77% 44.60% 85.49% 12.44% 82.11% 49.64% 26.15%
Source: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS)
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 1 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 5 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 10 percent level.Table 10 Shopfloor Committees (SFCs) and Workers Having Influence  
%worker who have a lot of involvement and influence on
Deciding how 









breaks, overtime and 
time off
Deciding what training 
is needed for people in 
your work group or 
department
Total
Workers in firms N 1858 1854 1854 1855
with SFCs % 47.36% 8.68% 17.31% 8.09%
Workers in firms N 1182 1177 1179 1180
without SFCs % 38.58% 6.54% 12.72% 5.25%
Unionized workers
Workers in firms N 1614 1611 1611 1612
with SFCs % 46.90% 8.07% 17.57% 7.51%
Workers in firms N 984 980 982 982
without SFCs % 37.91% 5.61% 13.24% 5.09%
Unionized workers with supervisory responsibilities
Workers in firms N 703 703 702 703
with SFCs % 57.18% 13.80% 21.23% 12.23%
Workers in firms N 325 324 325 325
without SFCs % 45.54% 9.26% 15.69% 8.92%
Unionized workers without supervisory responsibilities
Workers in firms N 911 908 909 909
with SFCs % 38.97% 3.63% 14.74% 3.85%
Workers in firms N 659 656 657 657
without SFCs % 34.14% 3.81% 12.02% 3.20%
For workers in firms with SFCs only
Total
Workers always  N 924 921 920 920
participating in SFCs % 54.44% 10.31% 21.96% 10.98%
Workers not always  N 864 863 864 865
participating in SFCs % 40.39% 6.84% 12.73% 4.62%
Unionized workers
Workers always  N 804 802 801 801
participating in SFCs % 53.23% 8.98% 22.10% 9.61%
Workers not always  N 747 746 747 748
participating in SFCs % 40.83% 7.10% 13.12% 4.81%
Unionized workers with supervisory responsibilities
Workers always  N 389 390 389 389
participating in SFCs % 60.93% 14.10% 24.42% 14.91%
Workers not always  N 292 291 291 292
participating in SFCs % 52.74% 12.71% 16.15% 8.22%
Unionized workers without supervisory responsibilities
Workers always  N 415 412 412 412
participating in SFCs % 46.02% 4.13% 19.90% 4.61%
Workers not always  N 455 455 456 456
participating in SFCs % 33.19% 3.52% 11.18% 2.63%
Source: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS)
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 1 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 5 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 10 percent level.Table 11 Small Group Activities (SGAs) and Workers Having Influence  
%worker who have a lot of involvement and influence on
Deciding how 









breaks, overtime and 
time off
Deciding what training 
is needed for people in 
your work group or 
department
Total
Workers in firms N 1327 1325 1325 1326
with SGAs % 47.17% 9.74% 18.79% 9.05%
Workers in firms N 1708 1701 1703 1704
without SGAs % 41.45% 6.41% 12.92% 5.34%
Unionized workers
Workers in firms N 1147 1146 1146 1147
with SGAs % 46.12% 8.90% 19.37% 8.72%
Workers in firms N 1446 1440 1442 1442
without SGAs % 41.42% 5.76% 13.11% 4.85%
Unionized workers with supervisory responsibilities
Workers in firms N 448 449 448 449
with SGAs % 59.60% 16.04% 25.22% 14.70%
Workers in firms N 577 575 576 576
without SGAs % 48.87% 9.57% 14.93% 8.33%
Unionized workers without supervisory responsibilities
Workers in firms N 699 697 698 698
with SGAs % 37.48% 4.30% 15.62% 4.87%
Workers in firms N 869 865 866 866
without SGAs % 36.48% 3.24% 11.89% 2.54%
For workers in firms with SGAs only
Total
Workers always  N 1120 1118 1118 1118
participating in SGAs % 49.46% 9.84% 19.14% 9.39%
Workers not always  N 199 199 199 200
participating in SGAs % 35.68% 9.55% 17.59% 7.50%
Unionized workers
Workers always  N 986 985 985 985
participating in SGAs % 48.17% 8.93% 19.59% 9.04%
Workers not always  N 153 153 153 154
participating in SGAs % 34.64% 9.15% 18.95% 7.14%
Unionized workers with supervisory responsibilities
Workers always  N 394 395 394 394
participating in SGAs % 60.41% 15.70% 24.37% 14.72%
Workers not always  N 52 52 52 53
participating in SGAs % 55.77% 19.23% 32.69% 15.09%
Unionized workers without supervisory responsibilities
Workers always  N 592 590 591 591
participating in SGAs % 40.03% 4.41% 16.41% 5.25%
Workers not always  N 101 101 101 101
participating in SGAs % 23.76% 3.96% 11.88% 2.97%
Source: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS)
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 1 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 5 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 10 percent level.Table 12 JLMCs and Workers Having Influence  
%worker who have a lot of involvement and influence on
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breaks, overtime and 
time off
Deciding what training 
is needed for people in 
your work group or 
department
Total
Workers receiving N 381 381 381 381
full information via JLMCs % 54.33% 10.24% 19.69% 9.45%
Workers not receiving N 2643 2635 2635 2638
full information via JLMCs % 42.53% 7.51% 14.91% 6.60%
Unionized workers
Workers receiving N 342 342 342 342
full information via JLMCs % 53.80% 9.06% 18.71% 8.19%
Workers not receiving N 2242 2236 2236 2238
full information via JLMCs % 42.02% 6.89% 15.56% 6.34%
Unionized workers with supervisory responsibilities
Workers receiving N 147 147 147 147
full information via JLMCs % 67.35% 16.33% 23.81% 14.97%
Workers not receiving N 874 873 873 874
full information via JLMCs % 51.49% 11.80% 18.79% 10.53%
Unionized workers without supervisory responsibilities
Workers receiving N 195 195 195 195
full information via JLMCs % 43.59% 3.59% 14.87% 3.08%
Workers not receiving N 1368 1363 1363 1364
full information via JLMCs % 35.96% 3.74% 13.50% 3.67%
Source: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS)
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 1 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 5 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 10 percent level.Table 13 Profit Sharing Plans (PSPs) and Gainsharing Plans (GSPs) and Workers Wanting Influence  
%worker for whom it is very important to have a lot of involvement and influence on
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breaks, overtime and 
time off
Deciding what training is 
needed for people in your 
work group or department
Total
Workers with PSPs N 2416 2410 2409 2409
% 76.12% 49.00% 31.71% 33.46%
Workers without PSPs N 566 564 565 563
% 70.49% 42.55% 30.27% 34.46%
Unionized workers
Workers with PSPs N 2163 2158 2157 2157
% 75.82% 48.52% 31.62% 32.68%
Workers without PSPs N 377 376 377 376
% 68.44% 40.69% 31.03% 31.91%
Unionized workers with supervisory responsibilities
Workers with PSPs N 904 904 903 903
% 78.10% 53.98% 32.89% 34.88%
Workers without PSPs N 103 103 103 103
% 77.67% 53.40% 27.18% 32.04%
Unionized workers without supervisory responsibilities
Workers with PSPs N 1259 1254 1254 1254
% 74.19% 44.58% 30.70% 31.10%
Workers without PSPs N 274 273 274 273
% 64.96% 35.90% 32.48% 31.87%
Total
Workers with GSPs N 1397 1391 1391 1390
% 77.74% 52.62% 35.30% 36.62%
Workers without GSPs N 1558 1556 1556 1555
% 72.91% 43.64% 27.96% 31.06%
Unionized workers
Workers with GSPs N 1278 1273 1273 1272
% 77.70% 52.08% 35.35% 35.85%
Workers without GSPs N 1236 1235 1235 1235
% 72.01% 42.67% 27.53% 29.23%
Unionized workers with supervisory responsibilities
Workers with GSPs N 527 528 527 527
% 79.32% 57.39% 36.24% 38.90%
Workers without GSPs N 472 471 471 471
% 77.12% 50.53% 28.03% 29.94%
Unionized workers without supervisory responsibilities
Workers with GSPs N 751 745 746 745
% 76.56% 48.32% 34.72% 33.69%
Workers without GSPs N 764 764 764 764
% 68.85% 37.83% 27.23% 28.80%
Source: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS)
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 1 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 5 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 10 percent level.Table 14 Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and Workers Wanting Influence  
%worker for whom it is very important to have a lot of involvement and influence on
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breaks, overtime and 
time off
Deciding what training is 
needed for people in your 
work group or department
Total
Workers with ESOPs N 862 861 861 861
% 75.41% 51.92% 31.13% 34.38%
Workers without ESOPs N 2148 2142 2141 2139
% 74.63% 45.80% 31.20% 32.96%
Unionized workers
Workers with ESOPs N 794 793 793 793
% 75.06% 50.69% 31.15% 32.91%
Workers without ESOPs N 1775 1771 1770 1769
% 74.25% 45.57% 31.24% 32.00%
Unionized workers with supervisory responsibilities
Workers with ESOPs N 384 384 384 384
% 74.22% 53.13% 33.59% 35.94%
Workers without ESOPs N 628 628 627 627
% 79.94% 53.82% 31.26% 33.01%
Unionized workers without supervisory responsibilities
Workers with ESOPs N 410 409 409 409
% 75.85% 48.41% 28.85% 30.07%
Workers without ESOPs N 1147 1143 1143 1142
% 71.14% 41.03% 31.23% 31.44%
Source: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS)
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 1 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 5 percent level.
two sample difference in proportion is significant at the 10 percent level.